ARTICLES

In its first stages the new struggle was between France and England alone; and it seemed evident that Napoleon would now attempt at all costs to carry out his project of invasion. Measures were therefore taken to increase the military forces available for the defence of the country. The Army of Reserve or Additional Force Act provided for the raising by ballot of a new army of 50,000 men, to serve for four years as a Reserve for the Regular Army. The militia was re-embodied; and the Defence Act provided for the enrolment of a Volunteer Force.
 
On July 18, 1803, a bill was introduced 'to amend and render more effectual' the Defence Act. According to this act, the Lords-Lieutenant of the counties were to oversee the enrolment of all men between the ages of 17 and 55, arranging them in four classes. The first three classes - consisting of unmarried men under 50 and married men under 30 with not more than two children less than ten years old - were, under penalty of a fine, to attend drill one day a week and to undergo from fourteen to twenty days' continuous training before the end of the year. Pitt supported the bill in the following speech: (1)

"I feel sincerely happy that this measure has been at length brought before the House, as it affords a prospect of that vigour which is necessary in the present conjuncture. I approve of its principle and object. It indeed is founded on the principles of the plan which, unconnected as I am with His Majesty's Government, I have thought it my duty to intimate to ministers. I have been always decidedly of opinion that such a measure was essentially necessary, in addition to our regular force, in order to put the question as to our domestic security entirely beyond all doubt. I am not now disposed, because, indeed, I do not think it necessary, to enter into any investigation of the degree of danger which the country has to apprehend, though I am aware it is material that the danger should not be underrated.

But to return to the measure before the House. I rejoice in its introduction as the most congenial in its spirit to the constitution of this country, and in its spirit to the constitution of this country, and in its execution not at all likely to meet any obstacle from the character or disposition of the people. In its structure there is nothing new to our history; in its tendency there is nothing ungrateful to our habits; it embraces the interests, it avails itself of the energies, and it promises to establish the security of the country. It imposes no burthens, nor does it propose any arrangement of which it can be in the power of any class of the community to complain. Its object is the safety of all, without containing anything in its provisions offensive to any. It is perfectly agreeable to the best institutions of civilized society, and has for its basis the rudiments of our constitutional history.

It is obvious that, unless we make efforts adequate to the crisis in which we are placed, the country is insecure, and if those efforts cannot be effectual without compulsion, I trust no man can entertain a doubt of the propriety of resorting to it: but I have a confident expectation that compulsion will be unnecessary; that the number of voluntary offers will be sufficient to obviate the necessity of that disagreeable alternative. It is, however, an alternative of which I hope no man will disapprove, should the necessity arise, and least of all my right honourable friend,(2) who has not, on a former occasion, hesitated to recommend that compulsion. By His Majesty's prerogative he has it in his power, at any time that the country is threatened with invasion, to call out all his subjects for its defence; and the object of the measure before the House is, that the people, when called out, should be prepared to second his views, should be trained to military evolutions, should be ready to act with promptitude in any quarter where their services might be required, should be capable of conforming to orders without confusion or delay, of collecting with celerity and acting with decision. Such a plan is highly desirable; for it would be unwise to leave the defence of the country placed on our naval force, however superior, or in our regular army, however gallant and well disciplined, or even in the people armed en masse, unless previously drilled in military manoeuvres and subject to the directions of Government, who, by the measure before the House, are to be invested with ample powers of rendering the application of this force effectual, and of directing it to the several branches of public service which circumstances may call for.

The training of the people, however, should be prompt. No delay should be suffered, for there is not room to allow it. The efforts of those to be entrusted with the execution of this important duty should be unremitted, and indeed of all public and private individuals, until the country shall be completely secure against any attacks of the enemy. This security is certain, if every man will be active in his station; and of that activity I have not the least doubt, if Government will give the proper stimulus.

With respect to the observations of my noble friend,(3) upon the sentiments of my right honourable friend(4) as to the dangers of invasion, the noble lord seems to have quite mistaken his meaning; for my right honourable friend did not at all describe the danger in such a way as to damp the spirit of the country, but rather to excite its caution and energy, by removing the idea that an invasion is impracticable; and as soon as that delusive notion shall cease to prevail, I am quite certain that the whole tenor of my right honourable friend's remarks will be to produce confidence of security in the public mind, at the time when that feeling of confidence ought to exist, either with reference to the safety of the State or of individuals. The amount of our danger, therefore, it would be impolitic to conceal from the people. It was the first duty of ministers to make it known, and after doing so, it should have been their study to provide against it, and to point out the means to the country by which it might be averted. It is quite impossible that a people will make adequate efforts to resist a danger, of the nature and extent of which they are studiously kept in ignorance. Upon those grounds I disapprove of the outcry so often raised against my right honourable friend and others, who have endeavoured by their speeches to rouse the energies of the country in the most effectual way, namely, by pointing out the necessity which existed for employing those energies. After, however, the grounds of apprehension shall have been extinguished, I have little doubt that the exertions of my right honourable friend will be to point the attention of ministers to such means of annoying the enemy as his ingenuity suggests; and that those ground will be removed with proper attention and activity on the part of ministers, I can have no doubt; for who can fear for the event, when millions of Englishmen are to be opposed to the detachment of the instruments of French ambition? And whatever the number of our invaders may be, they cannot, comparatively with the force I trust we shall have to oppose them, be more than a mere detachment.

I have not understood from the words of my right honourable friend that he had any fear as to the event, but that he wished solely to urge the adoption of such measures as might tend to give an effective direction to our natural strength. My right honourable friend has appeared to me very little to indulge in those gloomy presages which are ascribed to him by those of whose sluggishness, supineness, and inactivity he has been long in the habit of complaining. But I feel the most sincere gladness that the charge of supineness can no longer apply. His Majesty's ministers seem now determined upon rousing the spirit of the country, and upon giving that spirit a just and powerful direction. I hail, for the sake of my country, the appearance of this resolution. This is an auspicious day, though I cannot help expressing my surprise that this measure has not been submitted to the consideration of the House long ago: but even now I hope it will answer its purpose, that it will meet the approbation of Parliament, and that the people will promptly come forward to second its object. After the precise views of this country shall be made known, and after its dangers shall be fully understood, I am sure that no man will shrink from the calls of his country in this hour of peril, unless from motives such as he dare not avow.

Whether ministers ought sooner to have proposed this measure is a question into which I shall not now enter at large, but I will merely observe that, if it becomes necessary from a knowledge of the enemy's views, I believe no knowledge of that kind has been recently obtained - none of which ministers and the public were not aware at the time that war was declared, and even before. Why then was this important measure delayed? The danger to be looked for has been apprehended for a considerable time back, and upon the contingency of it my noble friend admits that, even during peace, a very large and expensive establishment was kept up. I cannot conceive any excuse that can be alleged for such procrastination. It did not proceed, I suppose, from the desire of ministers to consider the scale and measure of our dangers, or from an opinion on their part, that it was better they should be tardy and gradual in their measures against the gigantic efforts of the enemy. This cannot have been the reason, and really I see no difference in the state of Europe, nor in the relative situation of this country with respect to France, from what it was at the commencement of the war. I am, therefore, at a loss to divine the motives which have influenced the conduct of ministers, and why this measure was not brought forward long since. If there was no necessity to be active, if there was leisure for slow deliberation, then of course the period is not such, in their estimation, as to call for any extraordinary promptitude of exertion, or such as ought to excite alarm; but, in truth, if there was any particular measure which claimed precedency, it was that now under consideration, which could not interfere with any other military arrangements. The question simply is this - was it prudent to postpone the introduction of a measure which had for its object to prepare the people for a general armament, and which preparation must necessarily consume some time before it could be efficient? Yet, in the wisdom of ministers, this is the particular measure which is to be delayed to the last.

I will not, however, stop to inquire into the time which has been already lost; but I shall express my earnest hope that no time will be wasted hereafter - that every instant will be actively engaged until the country be completely safe. I think that some arrangements should be made to connect the different departments of the executive authority, so that, upon orders issued from Government to the Lords-Lieutenant of counties, the people might be immediately set in motion; so that, without interfering with agriculture, which should not by any means be disturbed, the several classes might be disciplined, to attend the drill at least two days in each week, to assemble in particular places throughout the country; the limitation of distance from the residence of each man to the place of assembly, to be about six miles, the time of attendance to be not less than half a day. The distance I propose is not more than the stout English peasantry are in the habit of going, when led to a cricket match or any rural amusement. These men, in my conception, might be disciplined by soldiers on furlough, who, on being called back to their regiment, when danger should actually reach our shores, might be enabled to bring with them one hundred sturdy recruits, prepared for military action through their means.

With regard to the motion before the House, I must say that it is not liable to the objections advanced by my right honourable friend, on the ground that it would have a compulsory operation, for in fact it does not propose to resort to compulsion, if the object can be attained by voluntary offers; and I am of opinion that the purposes may be so effected. These voluntary offers may be promoted considerably by the presence of the nobility and gentry in their respective districts, and on that account, I rejoice in the prospect that we are soon to separate, not only with reference to this, but to the other measures which have passed the House, and to the execution of which the presence I have alluded to must materially contribute. The great men of the country to animate by their example, to countenance by their authority, and to assist by their advice the operations of the people, have it in their power to achieve the most important good, to excite a zeal and devotion to the public cause, and to diffuse their own spirit through all ranks of the community.

With a view to those desirable advantages, I wish that the session may be short; and I hope that as little time as possible may be lost in examining and arranging the details of this important measure, and that, whatever reasons we may have to look for voluntary offers, we shall not rely on those offers altogether; for, as the representatives of the people, we are bound to provide for their safety, and to provide a sufficient force. Though they may not be disposed to take care of themselves, it is our duty to take care of them. If, therefore, voluntary offers shall not be adequate to the purpose, we must of course resort to compulsory proceedings.

The drilling of the men is, as I have already observed, the principal object to be attended to; but I beg it to be understood that, in my opinion, the poorer classes should be remunerated for the time they may be engaged in discipline. I hope it is so intended, though I have not heard anything of the kind mentioned by my right honourable friend in the opening. The man who is taken from his labour for the public safety, ought certainly to be paid for his time; and this would serve to reconcile such persons to a practice which, otherwise, would be justly considered a very great hardship.

As to the trouble which the nobility and gentry may be called upon to submit to, in this general armament, I cannot do them the injustice of supposing that they would not submit to it with alacrity, or that questions of mere personal convenience would, in such a crisis as the present, have any weight with them.

In the execution of this measure, I do not like the idea of waiting for the slow progress of a ballot. I think that unless the volunteers should, within a certain date, comply with the condition prescribed, their consent should not be waited for. In those parishes where the voluntary offers should not be promptly made, the compulsory levy should be promptly enforced. This compulsion, however, would not, according to my apprehension, be in any instance necessary, if the Lords-Lieutenant of counties, with the deputies and other persons of respectability, would go round from house to house in their respective districts, and solicit the people to come forward. This I know I am not too sanguine in believing would effectually accomplish, within one month, the ends we have in view without any compulsion whatever, particularly when they are apprised fully of the necessity for their service; when they are encouraged by the advice of their superiors; and when they have the satisfaction of knowing that the legislature have deemed their country's danger demands it.

Much has been said of the danger of arming the people. I confess that there was a time when that fear would have had some weight; but there never was a time when there could have been any fear of arming the whole people of England, and particularly not under the present circumstances. I never, indeed, entertained any apprehensions from a patriot army regularly officered, according to the manner specified in the measure before the House, however I might hesitate to permit the assemblage of a tumultuary army otherwise constituted. From an army to consist of the round bulk of the people, no man who knows the British character could have the least fear - if it even were to include the disaffected; for they would bear so small a proportion to the whole, as to be incapable of doing mischief, however mischievously disposed. There was indeed a time when associations of traitors, systematically organized, excited an apprehension of the consequences of a sudden armament of the populace: but that time is no more, and the probability is now, as occurred in the case of the volunteers, that, if there are still any material number of disaffected, by mixing them with the loyal part of the community, the same patriotic zeal, the same submission to just authority, will be soon found to pervade the whole body, and that all will be equally anxious to defend their country or perish in the attempt; that the good and the loyal will correct the vicious disposition of the disaffected, will rectify their errors, and set right their misguided judgements. We may thus enlist those among our friends who would otherwise, perhaps, become the auxiliaries of our enemy.

Under all these circumstances I feel that the objections urged upon this score are not tenable, and that they ought not to have any weight against a measure which is necessary to the preservation of public order and private happiness."
 
The bill was read a first time.

Pitt's speeches on the third reading of this bill and on the various measures which succeeded it display in their wealth of technical detail the mastery he had acquired of the whole subject of national defence. The following extracts contain his views on the more important and interesting points.

i. The maximum of effort needed(5)
"I am ready to admit to the honourable officer,(6) that our regular army is not quite so great as we could wish in this country, but we have provided means for augmenting it to a degree much greater than was ever known in this country; and in addition to all this, we are now providing an immense irregular force, the advantages to be derived from which are admitted and confirmed by the honourable officer himself, being indeed too obvious to be disputed by any one. As far, therefore, as relates to the description and to the extent of our force, Parliament has provided means, which to the honourable officer himself (cautious, honourably cautious, and anxious as he is for the safety of his country) appear sufficient to place this country in a state of absolute safety. All this is undoubtedly matter of great consolation; but at the same time it will not justify us in diminishing our anxiety, or in relaxing our efforts, for its completion, because there must remain some interval before all these plans are completely arranged and organized and brought to that state of perfection at which I hope they will, however, soon arrive; but even supposing that all the measures which I have stated were brought to perfection, still it would not dispense us from the necessity of adopting other means of defence, particularly in two points of view.

Suppose all the objects attained at this moment, yet the foundation of our security would not be these objects, however completely attained. Against the arduous and most desperate struggle in which we may be engaged, all these kinds of strength can only give us this kind of security, that if we are not wanting to ourselves, if we have not forgotten our national character, but remember who we are, and what we are contending for, the contest will be glorious to us and must terminate in the complete discomfiture of the enemy and ultimate security to this kingdom. But if there remain any measure, by the adoption of which our safety may be yet rendered, not the only more certain, perhaps, but more easy; by which our defence can be secured with less effusion of blood, less anxiety of mind, less interruption of the industry of the nation, less, I will not say of alarm, but of the evils, the inconveniences, the agitation that necessarily belong to a great struggle of this king, however short, or however certain its issue may be; - in a contest of such a nature it certainly would be most unwise to run any hazard of protracting it, or to neglect any means of shortening it still more if possible; - if, upon these grounds, I say, it can be pointed out to me that there are any means by which our regular army could be immediately increased and all our regiments completed, I should say that, although we are safe without it, yet our interest, our prosperity, and every object that can influence us, would require that such a measure should be adopted.

ii. The need of trained officers(7)
I certainly feel, as I ought to do, great distrust of my own opinion upon military subjects, and I always state those opinions with great deference; but I believe that it is universally admitted by all officers, that new recruits poured into an old corps, which has a number of experienced officers, will much sooner acquire a knowledge of discipline and become good soldiers than they will if they are left in a corps by themselves, whatever pains may be taken in their instruction. Taking that as an established point, I was therefore surprised and disappointed when I heard my right honourable friend the Secretary at War, instead of proposing to diffuse the 40,000 men of the army of reserve over the thirty-nine or forty battalions that are in England, in which case they would have all the advantages of all the officers of those old corps - instead of this, he talks of dividing them among thirteen battalions, by which means all the advantage which they would derive from the instruction of a great number of old and experienced officers would be very much diminished.

I know it may be said that the commissions in the army of reserve will in a great degree be filled up from the half-pay list, which certainly contains a great number of officers perfectly well qualified to instruct and discipline any men placed under their command. But in the first place, it must be recollected that the half-pay list would not furnish any non-commissioned officers, who are certainly the most essential in training raw recruits. There is, however, another consideration which strikes my mind, and which I believe has not yet been suggested to the House. Our situation in point of security will certainly be improved by the adoption of the measure which is now before us; but it must be recollected that, while it improves, it alters our situation. If we had voted only the army of reserve, undoubtedly it might be filled with able and experienced officers from the half-pay list; but we must recollect that, in addition to the army of reserve, we have voted an army of between three and four hundred thousand men.

That we shall have no difficulty in procuring the men who are to compose this force, I am perfectly satisfied, because the spirit of the country is now raised in the capital, and will from thence rapidly pervade all the extremities of the Empire. That spirit was first kindled in the north, from thence it has extended to the metropolis, and is now catching from town to town, from village to village, and very shortly the whole kingdom will, I am convinced, manifest one scene of activity, of animation, and of energy, displaying in its native lustre the character of Englishmen. That the men, therefore, will be procured with the greatest facility, I have not the smallest doubt; but we shall then want the means of preparing and drilling them, with all the accuracy that the shortness of the time will admit. Does it not then occur to the House that we shall have infinitely more use for the services of officers not attached to regiments? Does it not occur to gentlemen, that, in addition to the noblemen, the gentry, and the yeomanry of the country, many of whom will serve as officers, it would be advisable, to every three or four officers of this description, to add one or two from the half-pay list? Would not the adoption of this plan greatly accelerate the training and perfecting of this new force? It therefore does appear most clearly to me, that by allowing a greater number of battalions of the line to receive the army of reserve, you would have a greater number of officers on the half-pay to discipline the irregular force.

iii. The protection of London (8)
I know very well that the manly feelings and, if I may say so, the obstinate courage of my right honourable friend,(9) will not let him believe that the French would offer us such an insult as to come over here to fight us for our capital. I am sure I shall not be suspected of depreciating or of not placing due confidence in the army, in the navy, or in the courage of the people of England; on the contrary, I am firmly convinced that the enemy will find us to be invincible. But it must be admitted that in war there are accidents depending sometimes upon a day or an hour, in which, with the bravest and most numerous army, the enemy, by hazarding an operation for which in any other service a general would be broke or shot, but which a French general would attempt, because he knows he would be broke or shot if he did not, might obtain an advantage, the consequences of which might be most serious if some such measure as that recommended by the honourable officer was not adopted. We unfortunately know that attempts of this kind may be made, however rash or desperate, for those who will make them know that they will not appear so to Buonaparte. The proud despot of France will, however, have reason to tremble on his usurped throne, when the people of France find that they have sacrificed hundreds of thousands of men to gratify his ambition and his revenge. With respect to that despot himself, he would, I am sure, feel as little hesitation in sacrificing a hundred thousand Frenchmen, as he would millions of Englishmen if he had them within his grasp.

In arranging, therefore, the plan of national defence, we ought not to estimate upon probabilities merely. It is not enough for us to say that if he is eccentric and mad, he will pay the price of his madness and folly; we must take care that we do not pay for it first; we must not now disdain to adopt precautions which were formerly thought unnecessary. I cannot, therefore, agree with the short and decisive opinion of my right honourable friend, who, when the honourable officer recommended it to Government to fortify London, replied, 'I say, do not fortify it'. I must enter my protest against such language. He says, he would not affront the people of England by supposing that, while they have 80,000 seamen on board their fleet and have such an army as is now on foot, it could be necessary to fortify the capital. Why, Sir, in the first place as to the navy, we must remember, that although we have 80,000 seamen, a great part of them are detached on service in different quarters of the world, and consequently could not in any degree prevent an invasion at home. I am certainly not denying that the enemy would fin great difficulty and danger in transporting his army to this country, but it is by running desperate risks that he can alone hope for success. We may have a proud navy of ships of the line and frigates - I will not now stop to inquire whether that navy might not have been in readiness sooner - but I can conceive a case in which ships of that kind would not be sufficient to meet an innumerable flotilla of boats issuing from all the ports, harbours, and creeks on the opposite coast of France, and covering the Channel for several miles in length. Whether, in order to meet a force of this kind, it would not be wise to multiply the smaller sort of our naval force and to mount them with guns of heavy metal and with carronades, I do not know; I hope something of this kind has been done already. It is admitted, indeed, that our navy, great and powerful as it is, cannot be relied on with absolute certainty to prevent an invasion; because if it could, there would be no occasion for all the precautions which we are adopting.

But it is said, we ought not to fortify London because our ancestors did not fortify it. Why, Sir, that is no argument, unless you can show me that our ancestors were in the same situation that we are. Look back to the days when the genius, the wisdom, and the fortitude of Elizabeth defeated the proud and invincible Armada, fitted out by Spain to conquer us - and I trust that the invincible battalion from France will meet with the same fate - we must admit that not only the situation of this country, but of all Europe, is changed; and it is absurd to say that, when the circumstances are changed, the means of defence should be precisely the same. We might as well be told that, because our ancestors fought with arrows and with lances, we ought to use them now, and that we ought to consider shields and corslets as affording a secure defence against musketry and artillery.

iv. The magnitude of the danger(10)
Englishmen must look to this as a species of contest from which, by the extraordinary favour of Divine Providence, we have been for a long series of years exempted. If we are now at length called upon to take our share in it, we must meet it with just gratitude for the exemptions we have hitherto enjoyed, and with a firm determination to support it with courage and resolution. We must show ourselves worthy, by our conduct on this occasion, of the happiness which we have hitherto enjoyed and which, by the blessing of God, I hope we shall continue to enjoy. We ought to have a due sense of the magnitude of the danger with which we are threatened; we ought to meet it in that temper of mind which produces just confidence, which neither despises nor dreads the enemy; and while on the one hand we accurately estimate the danger with which we are threatened at this awful crisis, we must recollect on the other hand what it is we have at stake, what it is we have to contend for. It is for our property, it is for our liberty, it is for our independence, nay, for our existence as a nation; it is for our character, it is for everything dear and valuable to man on this side of the grave.

Parliament has now provided ample means for our defence; it remains for the executive Government to employ them to the best advantage. The regular army must be augmented to that point to which the means are now given to raise it; the militia must be kept high in numbers and unbroken in spirit; the auxiliary force must be as promptly raised and disciplined as the nature of things will admit; nothing must be omitted that military skill can suggest to render the contest certain as to its success and short in its duration. If Government show the same determination to apply all those means that Parliament has shown in providing them; if the people follow up the example which the legislature has set them, we are safe. Then I may say, without being too sanguine, that the result of this great contest will ensure the permanent security, the eternal glory of this country; that it will terminate in the confusion, the dismay, and the shame of our vaunting enemy; that it will afford the means of animating the spirits, of rousing the courage, of breaking the lethargy of the rousing the courage, of breaking the lethargy of the surrounding nations of Europe; and I trust that, if after being driven from our coasts, it will find the people of Europe reviving in spirits and anxious to retaliate upon France all the wrongs, all the oppressions, they have suffered from her; and that we shall at length see that wicked fabric destroyed which was raised upon the prostitution of liberty, and which has caused more miseries, more horrors to France and to the surrounding nations, than are to be paralleled in any part of the annals of mankind."