Extract from the diary of John R. Glover, secretary to rear Admiral Cockburn (on board "Northumberland") 1815

Author(s) : GLOVER John R.
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The full text of Glover’s account of “Napoleon’s last voyage” is available for download on our online digital library.

September 29

We had moderate and fine weather. Bonaparte appeared in very good spirits to-day, and asked various questions relative to the navy. After dinner he walked a length of time with the admiral ; and speaking of the navy of France, he said he believed some of the superior officers were tolerable good seamen, but that none of them were good officers ; that the best of them had been taken during the Revolution from the India and other merchant vessels ; and as the French navy was so little employed, the officers were unaccustomed to command in any difficult or trying circumstances, and therefore when they had accidentally fallen into such situations they always appeared to have lost their heads, became quite confused, and whatever they did was precisely what they ought not. He said Admiral Gantheaume did very well whilst with him (Bonaparte) at his elbow when coming from Egypt; but he added, if Admiral Gantheaume had been left to himself, he would have been taken twenty times over, for he constantly wanted to change the ship’s course to avoid one enemy or other, and by such over-precautions he would have lost as much by night as he gained by day. Bonaparte said he therefore obliged the admiral always to explain to him upon paper the exact situation of the ship, and the apprehended danger, after which it almost always occurred that he took upon himself to desire the admiral to continue in a straight course for Frejus, and to this alone he attributed their having got safe. Bonaparte also said it was a curious fact that Admiral Bruix, 1 on their way up to Alexandria, had actually explained to him very minutely the decided disadvantage a fleet must labour under by receiving at anchor an attack from an hostile fleet under sail ; and yet from the want of recollection and presence of mind upon emergencies which the general had alluded to, their admiral a few weeks after received at anchor Lord Nelson’s attacks, losing his own life, and nearly his whole fleet, to exemplify the correctness of his ideas and the impropriety of his conduct, but which Bonaparte said he was positive would not have been the case (inasmuch as relates to the fighting at anchor) had he himself been on the spot. Bonaparte added, on the same subject, that it struck him the French admirals had generally on coming to action lost too much time in making manoeuvres about forming the line, which had ultimately proved of no adequate advantage. He had therefore desired they might be instructed for the future, on approaching an enemy, that a signal to form the line as convenient for mutual support, and afterward a signal to engage would be always deemed fully sufficient to make to those under their orders ; and after this the captain of every ship in the fleet was to be held individually responsible to the Government for getting the ship he commanded quickly into close battle, and doing his best toward the destroying of some one of the enemy, which would at all events prevent the captains from covering their own neglect, as Dumanoir had done, by attributing ” errors to their chief.” 2 Bonaparte said he had, however, latterly resolved (unless some extraordinary emergency made it necessary) not to venture any more line-of-battle ships to sea until he should have had it in his power to have sent from the different ports 150 sail of the line at once, for the making up of which number he had laid all his plans. He affirmed that, from the efforts he intended to have made for this object, he believed very much time would not have elapsed before he would have completed them ; in the meantime, he said, whatever it might have cost him, he had determined on always keeping ten sail of frigates at sea, for the purpose of making and improving his officers. He added that when his frigates had been sent on distant voyages or cruises, they were apt to consider their danger pretty well over when once safely through our line of cruisers on the French coast, after which they generally relaxed in their vigilance and precautions. He had therefore decided to order these ten frigates in future to cruise only in the neighbourhood of England or Ireland, where they would be certain to have enemies, bad weather, and dangerous coasts to keep them always on the alert; and those which managed to escape being wrecked or captured, must of course in such situations do much more mischief to our commerce than had ever been done by the French frigates before in the open seas and southern latitudes. To the commanders of those who returned safe from such service, he said he would have given great promotion and rewards, and as fast as he heard of any being taken or lost, he should supply their place by fresh ones. 3 On the admiral’s remarking to him the difficulty he conceived he would have found in obtaining seamen to have followed up this plan, he replied that by the conscription for the marines, which he had lately established in all the maritime departments of France, he would have had as many seamen as he pleased ; its customary production without vexation would have given him 20,000 men a year, and already, for want of ships to put these seamen in, he had been obliged to form them into regiments for the protection of the coast. Admitting this, these men would only have been seamen because he chose to call them such. Bonaparte having walked this evening longer than usual, he did not join the vingt-un party, but retired early.
Latitude 4° 52′ S., longitude 3° 50′ E., this day at noon. 4

September 30.

 We had light airs and fine weather, with the wind to south-west. Bonaparte amused himself this morning by having the life of Lord Nelson read to him, and he seemed to take particular interest in that part relating to his trip to Egypt, and subsequent battle of Aboukir Bay, the account of which he has requested to have translated.
This day at noon we were in latitude 5° 7′ S., and longitude 5° 6′ E. 

October 1 and 2

October 1.
Our fine weather continued, with south-west winds. Bonaparte was again occupied the whole of the forenoon in listening to Bertrand reading the life of Lord Nelson. At the table he was cheerful, but confined his conversation to merely asking questions.
At noon, latitude 5° 39′ S., and 6° 26′ E. longitude.

October 2.
The south-west winds still continued, and the troop-ships dropped further and further astern ; nothing worthy of remark occurred. Bonaparte seemed to have quite given up the vingt-un party for chess, at which game he does not appear to make much progress.
At noon this day our latitude 6° 0′ S., longitude 5° 50′ E 

October 3.

Fine weather. Bonaparte walked for a short time before dinner, asking the distance now remaining to St. Helena, and the probable time of reaching it. At dinner he conversed freely; and speaking of his campaigns, he told the admiral that at the battle of Wagram he had under his command in the field, actually engaged, a greater number of men than in any of his other battles ; they amounted, he said, to about 180,000 bayonets, and at the same time he had in the field 1,000 pieces of cannon. 5 At Moscow, he said, though not much short of that number, he certainly had not so many ; and at the battle of Leipsic he did not think he had more than 1 40,000. 6 In answer to a question put to him by the admiral, he said he considered General Clausel to be decidedly the most able military officer now in France. Marshal Soult and other of the marechals were, he said, brave and able men for carrying into execution operations previously planned ; but to plan and execute with large armies, in his opinion none of them were by any means equal to General Clausel. Bonaparte asked who were considered our best generals, when Sir George Bingham having mentioned Lord Lynedoch, Lord Niddry, Lord Combermere, Lord Uxbridge, and others, Bonaparte replied, ” But I believe you think Lord Wellington the best.” Our evening was spent similarly to the former ones.
At noon this day we were in latitude 6° 53′ S., longitude 6° 40′ E.

October 4 and 5.

October 4.
Fine weather, with south-southwest winds. The conversation of our passengers was confined to the fine weather we have had, and the probable speedy termination of the voyage. Every one has hitherto enjoyed good health except Madame Bertrand, whose complaints have been more mental than bodily ; she has, however, suffered of late so much as not to be able to quit her cabin. The children are remarkably healthy, and certainly much improved by the voyage.
Our latitude and longitude to-day at noon were 7° 50′ S. and 7° 8′ E.

October 5.
Our fine weather still continues, and as our voyage shortens our squadron diminishes, having now only the Peruvian, Zenobia, and Bucephalus in company, the latter scarcely in sight. Nothing particular occurred to-day. Bonaparte played at piquet before dinner, and chess after.
This day at noon our latitude 8° 50′ S., longitude 8° 52′ E.

October 6 and 7.

October 6.
This day passed in the same unvaried routine, as to wind, weather, conversation, and passing our time, as many other previous days.
Our latitude and longitude this day were 9° 35′ S. and 9° 32′ E.

October 7.
The wind still continues to the south-southwest. The Bucephalus is no longer in sight, and the admiral seems determined not to be further delayed, therefore we may expect to reach St. Helena in another week, which I hope may be the case, as our passengers are becoming daily more and more impatient.
Our latitude and longitude this day at noon were 9° 30′ S. and 9° 50′ E.

October 8.

We have been anxiously expecting the south-east trade-wind, but hitherto without avail. Bonaparte to-day walked and talked a very considerable time with the admiral, giving him a succinct account of his rise to the eminence from which he is now fallen. Bonaparte said it was owing to the want of officers at the beginning of the revolutionary war that he was sent for (although then but a young captain of artillery) from the northern frontier, where he was serving, to take the command of the artillery before Toulon 7; that almost immediately after his arrival at this station he had pointed out to General Carteaux the necessity of making a great effort to get possession of the place, which was called Fort Mulgrave by us, which he (Bonaparte) engaged to do if General Carteaux would allow him, and foretold that that place once taken would oblige the English immediately to entirely evacuate Toulon. This proposal, however, General Carteaux would not listen to, and they therefore went on some time longer according to their former plan of attack, without materially advancing in the siege or doing any real good, until one of the representatives of the people coming to the army to overlook what they were about (as was customary at that time), Bonaparte directly laid before him his plans, and obtaining his approval, Carteaux was overruled and obliged to adopt the measures which Bonaparte had before proposed to him, which succeeding precisely according to his predictions, he was in reward promoted to the rank of general of brigade. 8.  He said he afterward went with a part of the same army into Savoy, where he rendered some further services ; but it having been just then determined, in consequence of the scarcity of officers for the infantry, to draft into it some of the officers of artillery, and it falling to his (General Bonaparte’s) lot to be one of these, he quitted the army and went to Paris to remonstrate, and to endeavour to avoid being so exchanged, but meeting with an unfavourable reception from a general of artillery, who was a representative of the people, and who had the chief management of these arrangements. After some high words passing between them, he (Bonaparte) retired in disgust, and putting on the dress of the Institute of Paris, to which he then belonged (having been elected to it in consequence of his proficiency in mathematics), he continued in Paris, endeavouring to keep quiet and from the armies, which he said, however, he should at last have been obliged to have joined, perhaps in a subordinate capacity, had not the advance of the Austrian general De Vins into Italy, and the retreat and alarm of the French army opposed to him, spread considerable consternation at Paris, which induced the Committee of Public Safety (who knew General Bonaparte was well acquainted with the locality of that country) to send for him to consult with him on the best measures to be adopted 9; and they were so satisfied with what he laid before them on the subject, that they immediately caused him to draw instructions for their general in Italy, upon his (Bonaparte’s) advice, and the committee then directed that General Bonaparte might remain near them in Paris to assist them on such military points as they might wish to consult him upon. The advice he gave, as before mentioned, Bonaparte said proved efficacious; their Italian army took up the position he had pointed out, and thereby was enabled to stand its ground, without falling any farther back, in spite of every effort of the Austrian general to force it, until it became strong enough to attack in its turn, which it ultimately did, and then defeated General De Vins, and was most completely successful. Bonaparte said he gained considerable credit on this account, and he remained at Paris attached to the Committee of Public Safety until the 13 Vendémiare, the day on which the Convention was attacked by the revolted sections of Paris, which last having gained considerable advantage over the troops of the Convention, then under the command of General Menou, Bonaparte was sent for by the Convention, and placed in the command of the troops in lieu of Menou ; 10 and succeeding in defeating the revolted sections, and in restoring order, he was immediately made commandant of Paris, which situation, he said, gave him considerable consequence, and in which he remained until he was made commander-in-chief of the army of Italy. He said it was not until after the battle of Lodi that he entertained an idea of ever being sufficiently in consequence to authorise his some day or other interfering with the government of France ; but then, finding all his plans to succeed so very far beyond his own expectations, he began to look forward (though without any decided plan) to such events as afterward took place, and he said the quantity of money which he sent from Italy to France with these views very considerably increased his popularity. After his campaign of Italy, and the consequent suspension of hostilities with Austria, he said the Directory became very jealous of his popularity, and were therefore anxious to get him into some scrape, to avoid which it required his utmost caution and finesse ; and this induced him not only to refuse an appointment offered him to conduct the diplomatic discussions then going on with Austria, but also the appointment (which was soon afterward offered him) to command the army for the invasion of England. 11
But when the command of the Egyptian expedition was proposed to him he immediately saw the advantages it offered him for getting out of the way of a jealous, arbitrary Government (by its measures running itself to ruin), and by placing himself at the head of an army for an expedition almost certain of success, leaving it open to him to return with increased popularity whenever he might judge the crisis favourable. Therefore, he said, the Directory being anxious to get him out of France, and he being equally anxious to get away from them, this Egyptian expedition did not fail to please both parties, and he warmly entered into it the moment it was proposed ; but he declared the proposition of this expedition did not originate with himself. 12 Having thus left France, Bonaparte said he anxiously looked for the events which brought him back to France ; and on his return there, he was soon well assured that there no longer existed in it a party strong enough to oppose him, and he immediately planned the revolution of the 18th Brumaire. He said that although he might on that day have run some personal risk, owing to the confusion which was general, yet everything was so arranged that it could not possibly have failed, and that the government of France from that day became inevitably and irretrievably in his hands and of those of his adherents. 13
He said, therefore, that all the stories and reports which might have been circulated of any intentions of arresting him, and of opposing his intentions, were all nonsense, and without any foundation in truth; for his plans had been too long and too well laid to admit of being so counteracted. He said that after he became first consul, plots and conspiracies against his life were very frequent, but by vigilance and good fortune they had all been discovered and frustrated. He said that one which was the nearest proving fatal to him was that in which Pichegru, Georges, and Moreau were concerned thirty-six of this party had been actually in Paris six weeks without the police knowing anything of it and which was at last discovered by an emigrant apothecary, 14 who, being informed against, and secured after landing from an English man-of-war, and the police having entertained some suspicions in consequence of the numbers which had been reported to have landed clandestinely about this time, it was judged this apothecary would be a likely person to bring to confession, if properly managed. Therefore, being condemned to death, and every preparation made for his execution, his life was offered him if he would give any intelligence sufficiently important to merit such indulgence, when the apothecary immediately caught at the offer, and gave the names of the thirty-six persons before alluded to, every one of whom, with Pichegru and Georges, were, by the vigorous measures adopted, found and secured in Paris within a fortnight. Bonaparte said (from what he afterward learnt) that previous to this plot being discovered it would probably have proved fatal to him, had not Georges insisted upon being appointed a consul, which Moreau and Pichegru would not hear of, and therefore Georges and his party could not be brought to act. 15
He said also that it was to be at hand for the purpose of aiding in this conspiracy, and to take advantage of any confusion that might arise, that the Duke D’Enghien took up his residence in the neighbourhood of Strasburg, in which city Bonaparte said he had certain information of the duke’s having been in disguise several times. On the admiral asking Bonaparte if the report of his having sent an order for the duke’s reprieve, which unfortunately arrived too late, was true, he replied it certainly was not true ; that the duke was condemned for having conspired against France, and he (Bonaparte) was determined from the first moment to let the law take its course respecting him, to endeavour if possible to check the frequent conspiracies. 16
On the admiral’s mentioning that the Duke D’Enghien was taken from the territory of the Duke of Baden, Bonaparte replied that did not in his opinion alter the case of the Duke D’Enghien. He said the Duke of Baden might have reason to complain of the violation of his territory, but that was an affair to be settled between him and the Duke of Baden, and not with the Duke D’Enghien, whom, when he had got him within the territory of France (no matter how), they had full right to try and punish for any act committed by him in France against the existing Government. Having walked very late this evening, we played a game of chess and retired.
At noon our latitude was 9° 55′ S., longitude 8° 56′ E. 

October 9-14

October 9.
Moderate weather, with a continuation of south-west winds ; nothing worth mentioning occurred to-day.
Our latitude and longitude at noon were 10° 23′ S. and 7° 21′ E.

October 10.
Weather the same as heretofore ; the Redpole in sight at a great distance.
Our latitude and longitude this day at noon were 10 59′ S. and 5° 41′ E. The wind southerly.

October 11.
Our conversation was confined to the approaching termination of our voyage.
Our latitude and longitude at noon were 12° 2′ S. and 4° 11′ E.

October 12.
We have at length got the south-east trade-wind, and are making rapid strides toward St. Helena.
Our latitude and longitude to-day at noon were 14° 8′ S. and 0° 29′ E.

October 13.
We had a steady south-east trade, and cool, pleasant weather. Bonaparte for some days past has been less communicative than usual, and our days have passed in one continued sameness.
Our latitude and longitude to-day at noon were 15° 23′ S. and 4° 54′ W.

October 14.
Pleasant weather. Numerous were the conjectures whether or not we should see the land. The admiral decided we should see it at six o’clock, and so correct was he in his calculations that the time we saw it did not differ a minute, at which Bonaparte and all the French party seemed much astonished. The Zenobia was despatched to apprise the governor of our approach, and we lay to for the night.
Our latitude and longitude at noon were 16° 8′ S. and 5° 57′ W.

October 15 and 16.

October 15.
We anchored about half-past ten, and found here the Havannah, Icarus, and Ferret, which had got the start of us. The governor came on board, and the admiral returned with him to determine on the spot for Bonaparte’s future abode. We amused ourselves in surveying the stupendous barren cliffs of St. Helena, whose terrific appearance seemed to but ill accord with the feelings of our guests. In the evening the admiral returned, having taken a house in the town as a temporary residence for Bonaparte and his followers.

October 16.
The admiral went on shore early for the purpose of visiting Long wood House, to see how far it would be able to accommodate our guests. He returned early to dinner, and made a favourable report of the situation of Longwood. Marechal Bertrand went on shore in the afternoon to arrange the lodging, but Bonaparte, at his own particular request, delayed disembarking until it was dark, to avoid the gaze of the inhabitants, who were crowded on the wharf to see a person who had heretofore kept nations in a state of warfare and dread for nearly twenty years. We landed about seven o’clock, and all the French party were lodged at the boarding-house taken for them at the lower end of the town. 17

The next morning at six o’clock [that is October 18]

Bonaparte mounted on horseback, and, in company with the admiral, visited Longwood House (the residence of the lieutenant-governor, and belonging to the Company), which had been previously fixed on by the admiral and governor as the future residence of Bonaparte and his suite. Bonaparte seemed very well satisfied with the situation and expressed a desire to occupy it as soon as possible. This house, however, requiring not only repairing but considerable enlarging, which would occupy much time, and the general mentioning his dislike to return to the town, the admiral proposed his visiting the ” Briars”, a small cottage (the residence of Mr. Balcombe), which was near the Longwood Road, and about a mile and a quarter from the town. This proposition was immediately acquiesced in by Bonaparte, and on reaching this cottage he instantly expressed a wish to be allowed to occupy a small detached building on an eminence close to the cottage (built by Mr. Balcombe as a dining-room), of about twenty-two feet by sixteen, with a very small ante-room, and two garrets overhead, until Longwood House might be ready, stating there was quite room enough for him. This request was immediately complied with, and the admiral returned to the town by himself, leaving Bonaparte in charge of Mr. Balcombe’s family. Bonaparte’s camp-bed was put up in this room without delay; Count Las Cases and his son occupied the two garrets over it. After a few days a marquee was attached to the front of this building and fitted up as a dining-room; and here Bonaparte passed the first two months of his detention, without going out of the grounds, except in one or two instances. He seldom came out of his room until the afternoon, when he amused himself by walking in the garden (a very productive and perfectly secluded spot, abounding with various fruits, such as mangoes, apples, guavas, pomegranates, oranges, lemons, grapes, figs, peaches, &c.), or reading in a small bower of vines, which was lined for him with canvas to keep out the rain, of which there was daily more or less. In the evening he generally invited himself into the cottage, and played cards with the family for two or three hours. Mr. Balcombe’s family consists of himself (a truly good-natured and most hospitable, liberal man of plain manners), Mrs. Balcombe, two Miss Balcombes (women grown, although the one is but fifteen and the other between thirteen and fourteen), and two boys, the one about seven and the other five years old. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Balcombe understands French, but both the Miss Balcombes speak it tolerably well, and Bonaparte appeared much delighted in their society. 18
These young ladies in a few days became perfectly familiar, and the general seemed highly pleased with their naïveté, particularly that of the younger (a pretty girl, and a most complete romp when out of sight of her father). He occasionally so completely laid aside his imperial dignity as to romp with these young ladies, who during such diversions as “Blindman’s Bluff”, &c., called him by the familiar appellation of “Boney”; indeed, the younger, who appeared his favourite, said anything and everything to him her lively imagination dictated, asking every possible question, and he answering without the slightest apparent reserve. About the middle of December, after very great exertions of the admiral, with the aid of the crew of the Northumberland, Longwood House was sufficiently repaired, augmented, and furnished for Bonaparte and all his followers, with the exception of Marechal Bertrand, for whom a small cottage near Longwood has been hired, until some detached apartments are erected within the grounds of Longwood as a residence for him and Madame Bertrand. Longwood House, of which a plan is annexed, is nearly five miles from James Town. The first three miles of the road are up-hill and zigzag ; the other part is level, round a very deep and dreary looking ravine, which, contrasted with the entrance of the grounds, adds much to their appearance, which is really that of an English gentleman’s country-seat. It is built on the most level spot on the island, in a park of about four miles in circumference. The house is now made commodious and comfortable; the rooms are not large, but, including the servants’ rooms, there are more than forty in number, as described in the accompanying plan, and tolerably well furnished. The air at Longwood is cooler than any other part of the island, the thermometer seldom rising above 65. It is about 1,750 feet above the level of the sea, and is surrounded by a very extensive plain, on which the 53rd Regiment are encamped. The grounds of Longwood are thickly planted with an indigenous tree called gum-wood, which at a distance has a pleasing appearance, but when in the park the one continued sameness of a stunted tree with dark green foliage is tiresome to the eye. 19
From the house you have a commanding view to the eastward of the sea and the shipping, and to the northward the camp of the 53rd forms a pleasing object in the foreground to any one except Bonaparte, who seems to loathe the sight of a British soldier, and at whose particular request great pains were taken to place the camp out of his sight. But this could not be done without giving up the very best situation for a camp. Part of the park is cultivated as a farm by the Company, and forms an agreeable variation. The grounds of Longwood are entirely private to Bonaparte (with the exception of the farmer and his labourers, who are confined to the cultivated part). Sentries are placed around the park to prevent all intruders, and no one can enter without a pass from the governor, the admiral, or the commandant of the forces. Some distance without the park there is a second cordon of pickets and sentinels forming an enceinte of about twelve miles, within any part of which Bonaparte or any of his followers can amuse themselves by either walking or riding, unaccompanied by any one, but they cannot extend their excursions beyond this boundary without being accompanied by an English officer if Bonaparte himself, by a captain, for which purpose, and to superintend the guard at Longwood Gate, and the sentries placed around the house after dark, a captain of the 53rd has constantly lived in a room attached to the house. A carriage, a phaeton, and twelve horses have been furnished for Bonaparte’s use, and he frequently amuses himself both on horseback and in his carriage, but he has declared he will not go without the boundary, so long as he is restricted to be accompanied by an English officer, to do away which he has used every possible argument and endeavour with the admiral, but to no avail. Bonaparte, on first taking up his abode at Longwood, expressed a great dislike to see soldiers near him, and carried his weakness so far as to request that if it was necessary to keep constant watch over him, the sentries might not wear their uniforms ; but in this request he, of course, did not succeed. However, to humour him, the admiral allowed the officer of the guard, who lived in the house, to wear plain clothes. Bonaparte leads a secluded life, few or none ever going near him, although no person of respectability has been refused a pass when asked for, but so little is he now thought of, that his name is seldom or never mentioned except on the arrival of a ship ; indeed, the inhabitants express so little curiosity that two-thirds of them have not yet seen him (although he has been at St. Helena eight months), nor do they ever seem inclined to go a hundred yards out of their way for that purpose. Even Mrs. Wilkes, the wife of the late governor, although she was six months in the island after he arrived, went away without seeing him, whereas the curiosity of the passengers going home from India has almost exceeded credibility.

Notes

1 This should be "Brueys." Admiral Bruix remained in French waters in 1798-9, and failed to carry out the instructions which might have led to the relief of Bonaparte in Egypt. Brueys perished on the flagship E Orient at the Battle of the Nile. J. H. R
2 See note page 144
3 This proof of Napoleon's belief in the survival of the fittest is interesting. For his guerre de course, adopted after Trafalgar, see note, p. 63. See, too, pp. 124, 125. J. H. R
4 Some of the polar coordinates have been corrected by Peter Hicks via Google Earth
5 These numbers are slightly in excess of those actually engaged. Marshal Marmont states in his Memoirs that he saw the returns of the French army at Wagram as 167,000 in all, that is including the cavalry and artillery. J. H. R. 
6 At Leipzig, Napoleon had about 190,000 men and 734 guns ; but the allies had, in all, more than 300,000 men.J. H. R. 
7 A curious misstatement. Bonaparte, in August, 1793, arrived with his family from Corsica; he was soon told off to serve in the "Army of Nice"; but, owing to the lack of officers and the Jacobin forces before Toulon, was detained by the Commissioners Saliceti and Gasparin, and sent to take part in that siege. J. H. R. 
8 See note, p. 56
9 De Vins occupied Savona in June, 1795, and the French retreated to Loano. Bonaparte had drafted his first plan of campaign for Italy at Colmars on May 21, 1794. The second plan, or plans, belong to July, 1795. In August, Bonaparte was appointed to a post in the Typographical Bureau of the Committee of Public Safety. He did not, as here stated, hold this post continuously up to 13 Vendémiare (1795); for he was dismissed from the army and the public service on September 15, 1795, owing to his having refused to go to La Vendee as an infantry officer. J. H. R.
10 Bonaparte was merely included among the generals placed under the command of Barras. J. H. R. 
11 Incorrect. Bonaparte took diplomatic matters into his own hands at the time of the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace with Austria at Leoben (April 18, 1797), and kept them in his hands until the conclusion of the treaty at Campo Formio (October 17, 1797). He was appointed to command the "Army of England," but reported in February, 1798, that that expedition was impracticable. The Egyptian enterprise at that time was his dearest wish. J. H. R.
12 Magallon, Consul of France in Egypt, advocated the expedition in a report received in February, 1798. Bonaparte also pressed strongly for it. J. H. R.
13 The coup d'etat of 19 Brumaire (November 10), 1799, would have failed but for the skill of Lucien Bonaparte, who refused to put to the Council the motion of outlawry against his brother. J. H. R.
14 This apothecary was Querel, or Querelle, who was quite possibly an agent of the police. He disclosed (we should now say "disclosed" rather than "discovered") the news on February 14, 1804. It is certain that Napoleon, through his unofficial police, that of Fouche, knew of the plot ; for he wrote on November i, 1803, to his chief controller of police, that he must not be in a hurry about making the arrests. J. H. R.
15 This is incorrect. Moreau withdrew from all connection with Pichegru as soon as he knew that he was bound up with Cadoudal. J. H. R.
16 This admission, and Napoleon's insertion of a similar statement in his will, do away with all the efforts made by his apologists to throw the blame on Talleyrand, &c. Napoleon, before he gave the final instructions which led to the death of the Duke, knew quite well that he had had no connection with the Cadoudal plot. See "Camb. Modern History," vol. ix. (Napoleon), pp. 30-31 J. H. R.
17 We are informed that in the original manuscript the next entry is not dated, but was evidently written in by the same hand some months later, from notes taken at various times. Napoleon landed at Jamestown, St. Helena, on October 17, i8i 5 .-J. H. R. 2 That is, on October 18. J. H. R.
18 For the Balcombes and their house, see Mrs. Abell (Betsy Balcombe), "Recollections of the Emperor Napoleon at St. Helena" (London, 1844); also Las Cases, "Memorial de Ste. Helene," under date October 17 et. seq., 1815. J. H. R.
19 Surgeon Henry, "Events of a Military Life " (chap, xxviii.), gives a glowing account of the climate and shrubs, &c., of the upper part of St. Helena. J. H. R.

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