From Eylau to Friedland, or what happened to the "Fourth Coalition"

After the battle of Eylau, Napoleon was faced with two imperatives: one, to take his army into the safety of winter-quarters and to rebuild the health and confidence of the army after the difficult encounter in the snow of February 1807; and two, to protect the army's supply lines and situation so far from France and potentially attackable by allies arriving in his rear, either from the north (Britain or Sweden) or from the south (Austria). The emperor's actions were thus to a certain extent mapped out for him.
 
In order to prevent Austria from coming to Russia and Prussia's aid through Silesia, Napoleon mounted a diplomatic offensive via Talleyrand. In fact it was a counter-offensive since Russian (and British) diplomats had been working since the beginning of the year trying to get Austria once more into the fray. Austria however knew not only that Napoleon had Eugéne de Beauharnais stationed with his troops of the Austrian border ready to intervene should Austria stir but also that her margin for manoeuvre was severely compromised by the states of central and southern Germany now closely militarily allied to France via the Confederation of the Rhine. Austria was badly placed to undertake a military operation with her still battered forces in Silesia. As for attack from the north west, Napoleon had Mortier blockade the town (and island of) Stralsund and more importantly had Lefebvre besiege Danzig. The heavily fortified coastal town was not only held by Prussians (Danzig at the time was in East Prussia) but contained precious food and other goods needed by the Grande Armée (when the city finally fell, it would appear that there was no longer any gunpowder there – a British cruiser was seized trying to deliver powder to the garrison and Napoleon does not mention powder in his letters after the city fell). That success in the siege was important and that the campaign could not continue until siege was concluded in France's favour is shown by the quantity of letters from Napoleon to Lefebvre, instructing the officer on how to go about the siege, what terms to give the garrison and by his award to Lefebvre of the title ‘Duc de Danzig'. By May 1807 came around, Napoleon clearly wanted the siege to end, as is shown by the relatively lenient terms given to Kalkreuth and his men within the city. He was ready for the long-awaited decisive action which would bring the campaign to an end, and he could not afford to have his rear threatened.
 
In addition to his activity in the military sphere, Napoleon was also moving on the diplomatic front. As noted above, Austria had to be kept quiet (by a mixture of threats and cajoling). He also used diplomatic means to weaken his immediate opponents, notably by creating diversions. It was with this aim that the emperor signed a cooperative treaty with Persia in Finckenstein in May – one of the key articles was aid to Persia in its fight with Russia in Moldavia and Walachia. The direct result of this was that Russian troops would be taken away from the Polish front to fight in the Danubian provinces. That this was a temporary measure is shown by Napoleon subsequent lack of interest in the Persian alliance. Once Russia had been beaten into submission at Friedland and was allied to France, France took the Russian side and the French ambassador in Persia, Gardane, was left to negotiate in Persia without support from Paris (in 1809 Gardane eventually gave up and returned to Paris in disgrace, much frustrated by the lack of support from the metropole).

Another sphere of diplomatic action was Turkey. This again was a theatre which affected Russia since Turkey and Russia shared a border. Any action in this region would put pressure on Russia's southern flank, forcing the deployment of troops away from the Polish campaign. French support of Turkey was successful twice in the first part of 1807. In February a British squadron in the Dardanelles attempted to bombard the Porte into backing down against Russia. A battery of three hundred cannon organised by French artillery specialists drove off the British force inflicting significant damage. Another heavy-handed British mission, this time to occupy the city of Alexandria in Egypt (a pre-emptive strike to stop France occupying it) also ended in disaster which huge loss of troops. The Egyptian forces (Turkish allies) there had been advised by the French agent in Suez.
 
And so with the Baltic coast secured (Stralsund and Danzig blockaded or taken) and the Mediterranean settled (Persian and Turkish forces attracting Russian and British military engagements), all that remained was the showdown with Russia and the remnants of the Prussian army.
 
Britain, always Napoleon's principal enemy, was courted throughout this period of autumn/winter 1806-1807 by Russia, specifically to provide funds for the conflict. The ministry of “all the Talents” had however resolutely turned its face away from serious engagement in Europe. Its main zone of operations were in faraway places such as South America, India, the Dardanelles and Egypt, and all three were unmitigated disasters, directly leading to the collapse of the ministry. Diplomatic overtures from Russia were greeted with suspicion and grudging offers (but not actual provision) of funds. In the end it was this distrust, lack of interest, and un-generous attitude which drove Alexander in Napoleon's arms. Whilst the Russian may not have said to Napoleon ‘I hate the British as much as you do', he clearly felt that way after Friedland. As at Jena, Britain was a cool partner to Russia and Prussia at the very most (unlike Prussia and Russia, Britain was not a signatory at Bartenstein – indeed, one of the articles of the treaty was the securing of British participation in the struggle…), and she did too little too late (Canning blamed the previous cabinet for the disastrous state of Russian-British relations). Encouraged by Bartenstein, Britain had agreed to provide £ 2.6 million and a force of British troops to land at Stralsund. But the men did not set sail until 19 June, 5 days after the battle of Friedland…
 
So in June 1807, the timorous Bennigsen retreated down the right bank of the river Alle towards Königsberg in an attempt to protect the Prussian king. But Napoleon outmanoeuvred him, second-guessing that he would try to cross the river at Friedland. Bennigsen flouted one of the fundamental rules of engagement (never fight with your back to a river) and Lannes performed a hugely successful holding operation, keeping a much greater Russian force engaged until the main body of the Grande Armée could arrive. Though they fought bravely, Bennigsen's men were steamrollered into the river by French troops attacking them frontally and on the flanks. It was Napoleon's most perfect victory. And what little had been organised of the “Fourth Coalition” had been blown away. But Napoleon was not to press home his advantage by pursuing the fleeing Russians. He was lenient preparing the ground for the new political face Europe, where Russia, the final piece in the continental jigsaw, would be set alongside the rest of the Napoleonic Europe, resolutely blocking British goods and bringing that mercantile power to bankruptcy and to its knees.