'A Harsh, But Necessary, Apprenticeship': New French Accounts and a Previously Unknown Sketch of the Battle of Trafalgar

This article presents a translation of a letter written in Paris by Alexandre d’Hauterive, French interim Foreign Minister, dated 7 November, 1805, and sent to Talleyrand who was at that time in Berlin. Attached to the letter was an eyewitness account and sketch of the battle of Trafalgar.(The French version of the text was published in Revue du Souvenir napoléonien, nos. 460-61 (double edition), octobre-novembre 2005, p. 108-113.) This letter and the eyewitness account are currently privately owned and have (to my knowledge) never been translated. This is the first time that the sketch has been presented to an English-language audience. The significance of the sketch and the description is that they corroborate recently proposed theories explaining Dumanoir’s curious inactivity during the Battle of Trafalgar. Dumanoir was criticised at the time for keeping his squadron in place, for not reacting to Nelson‘s attack and for coming down the line too late to aid the ships in the centre – some critics even maintained that he had staged a pretend fight far from the action and then taken to his heels. I also reproduce a translation of the log book of the ship Mont-Blanc (a ship captured on 4 November off Cape Ortegal and so the log is currently held in the National Archives in London). It is similarly little known.

These three documents all corroborate recent theories that Dumanoir should be given the benefit of the doubt. They show that Nelson’s column pinned Dumanoir’s squadron down by heading for the van, before heading for the allied centre at the last minute. Nelson’s action was in fact a massive feint (and an extraordinary feat of seamanship given the almost complete lack of wind). Furthermore, since Victory and every vessel behind her did the same, Dumanoir’s ships were pinned down. Indeed Dumanoir himself protested as much in his article in the Times of 2 January, 1806:(Reproduced in The enemy at Trafalgar, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1906, p. 235.) “the left column of the English, having Admiral Nelson at its head, bore at first on the French vanguard, which I commanded…”. Another of the commanders in Dumanoir’s squadron, Lieutenant Conor, in Héros, also noted that although Nelson had veered towards the centre, the ships behind him kept on in the original line, still threatening the van and thus immobilising it.(Report by lieutenant Conor, Archives de la Marine, (Vincennes), Sous-série Marine BB4, 237, 24 October, 1805, Rapport du lieutenant de vaisseau Conor, commandant provisoire du vaisseau le Héros, quoted in Michèle Battesti, Trafalgar. Les aléas de la stratégie navale de Napoléon, [s. l.]: Napoléon Ier editions, 2004, p. 276. See also French Captain Berranger's (Scipion) words ” [I opened fire on] a three-decker at the head of the northern column which was heading for the centre of our van”, quoted in Geoffrey Bennett, The Battle of Trafalgar, B.Y. Batsford, 1977, p. 191.)

Another interesting feature of the account here presented is the initial description of the British line first heading for the southernmost tip of the enemy line in a single file. This line then split into two columns, but continued to head for Gravina‘s end of the combined line, now the rear since Villeneuve had given the signal for all allied ships to about turn. These two columns then parted company, one heading for the southern tip, the other the northern, only to veer towards the centre at the last moment. Another perhaps significant feature is the convex nature of the curve of the combined Franco-Spanish fleet. Almost all other sources give a concave line. Along with this account is also included the more formulaic representation of the battle, resembling the famous Magendi version. This engraving was printed in Tuscany and is held in the Paris Foreign Affairs Ministry Archives.(MAE, Correspondence politique, Toscane, 157B.) It was sent to Talleyrand by Napoleon’s step-son, Eugéne de Beauharnais, with an ironic comment on ‘public opinion’ in the region. The accompanying letter (dated 3 Nîvose, An XIV, 24 December, 1805) reads “They have made an engraving here, which your Excellency will find herewith enclosed. Your Excellency knows the ‘spirit’ here in Tuscany: as a result, the engraving is selling particularly well.”

Letter from Alexandre d’Hauterive, French interim Foreign Minister, dated 7 November, 1805, to Talleyrand in Berlin.

My Lord,

The appalling news from Cadiz is spreading amongst those who have made it their business to get it. It has broken today.

It is in vain that the Navy Ministry has passed a law holding publication back until it can be adjusted so as to be made moderate and prudent; the public is perhaps better informed with details than the ministry. This at least is the conclusion you could come to if you compare the official details which, I suppose, were sent from Spain, with the account which I have the honour to communicate to you and which came to me here by private correspondence. I have included with this account a rough sketch of disposition of the site.(The first official admission in France of the existence of the naval battle at Trafalgar was published in the Mercure de France, no. CCXXVIII 2 Frimaire, An XIV (Saturday 23 November, 1805), citing a bloody naval engagement off Cadiz and the death of Nelson. The official Spanish version was published in Madrid on 16 Brumaire, An XIV (7 November, 1805). Napoleon himself famously did not refer publicly to the defeat until 2 March, 1806 (before the Corps Législatif) noting simply “Storms caused the loss of a few ships after a battle imprudently engaged.”)

I no longer speak of this event with the profound affliction with which I addressed you yesterday. I have moved on from the blow of the first impressions and I am better disposed to seek, and more skilful at finding, the considerations which are best for softening the bitterness of such a loss. Doubtless the disaster was great, but honour has not been lost. To be beaten by a more skilful enemy is not a disgrace and brings no humiliation whatsoever. The enemy did not outdo us in courage, he beat us, but he knows that we can stand up to his superiority, a superiority which we will doubtless equal and perhaps surpass. The French navy, disorganised as it is in troubled times, debased by the negligence, the poverty and mismanagement of a series of Revolutionary governments and ministries only needs one thing today, battle experience. Defeats are a harsh, but necessary, apprenticeship.

It was in this way that the first military people in the world learned lessons in the school of disaster and bravery so as to become better than their masters and to avenge its first defeats by the destruction of the nation which claimed, like Britain, to be the prime, and perhaps only, maritime power in the universe.

I had the honour of informing you on Sunday that on the day before Monsieur de Lucchesini (Jérôme, Marquis de Lucchesini, Lucca 1752-1825, Prussian special emissary and plenipotentiary minister in Paris.) sent a message to his court. I then tried to discover what motive there could be for the sending of a message by a minister who had no personal relations or any specific business with the government alongside whom he resides. It is in all probability that Monsieur de Lucchesini – who is almost publicly considered to have relations with financiers, and such an imputation has become very critical since financiers always speculate on the drop in prices – got the news concerning Cadiz from them (which they knew on Saturday) and on which they have been speculating for five days and of which they did not inform the public until today.(I.e., 7 November. Insider dealing was known during the First Empire. Talleyrand is thought to have made a killing because he knew the result of the Battle of Marengo beforehand, and there is a long-held (though groundless) belief that the Rothschild banking family profited on advance knowledge of the result at Waterloo.) I make no comment on this circumstance; I can only note with mortification that the Navy ministry only received the dispatches on Tuesday and that the financiers were three days better off, and that a foreign minister was probably informed before we were regarding an event which concerns us to the utmost degree and that the news arrived in Berlin possibly even slightly before it could have been delivered to the emperor’s headquarters.(On 7 November, Napoleon was in Linz (Austria) leading the Grande Armée towards the battle of Austerlitz.)

I cannot, my Lord, express in terms with sufficient strength and emphasis how business in Paris is in a terrible state because of the weakness of the banks.(The United Merchants scandal (Les négociants réunis) was a triple crisis (treasury, economic and monetary) which nearly brought the young imperial administration to its knees. The situation got so bad that banks began opening for only a few hours in the day to limit payments, and crowds besieged banking premises in order to exchange their paper money for hard cash. See Pierre Branda, Napoléon et l'argent, Paris: Fayard, 2007, pp. 259-280.) Public opinion on this point is disquieted and discouraged to the highest degree. I suppose that those whose job it is to report to the His Majesty on important matters occurring in his absence have made it their duty to omit nothing, whether concerning the causes of the current situation, the current situation itself and the possible repercussions. If they had not done it, they would have been guilty of a very dangerous negligence. Bank credit is declining rapidly, bankers are losing all respect, banknotes keep dropping in value (they are 7% below their face value and no one knows how far they will fall), and all values have become partially fictive in proportion to the drop in value of bank notes. Commodities are becoming more expensive, subsistence is becoming rare; providing for Paris will soon become the object of concern and fear.

Rents and shares have a nominal value which is fairly high, but when the value of the money used to buy them is deducted from this, the real value is low, and dropping. In this way, shares valued at 59 are only really worth 52. And their value will drop again tomorrow and the day after that. This state of affairs had generated a type of commerce which is extremely pernicious but very lucrative. A man with a 1,000-franc note, with a modicum of patience can earn 60 to 70 francs a day. The police have been concerned by this scandal and have thought it necessary to intervene once again, but their much-feared intervention only serves to increase the disorder. Bankers and people who know about these things are being asked what they think of this state of affairs, but they only reply with gloomy prognostications. People shout about the causes, they cite the consequences and deplore the present and the future, but no-one can see a remedy. Even military glory in this context has lost its power to reassure people. We have seen how victories so remarkable that the history of the world has never seen the like are not enough to repair the damage caused by a false fear and a momentary problem. The fear which we thought beaten has come back, and the problems have become even more serious and complicated. It must be said that it is only the perspective of a relatively early peace (bringing with it a feeling of affection, admiration and gratitude) which could heal the deep wound in public opinion. If by some miracle the emperor were here in Paris for fifteen days, I swear that after the first week, the problems at the bank and the lack confidence in bank notes would cease merely because of his presence.

The bureau was not able to analyse all the newspapers yesterday and has just sent me the rest of its analysis. I have the honour to include it here.

Once again, your Excellency, accept my devotion and respect.

Hauterive

Paris [Thursday] 16 Brumaire, XIV [7 November, 1805]

P.S. I know for sure that …(Following name unreadable.) received the news of Cadiz by a courier who arrived on Friday 11(11 Brumaire was in fact a Saturday (2 November).) and that Monsieur Lucchesini announced it at his house on Saturday 12(12 Brumaire was in fact a Sunday (3 November).).

Account of the Battle, forwarded by A. d’Hauterive

The combined fleets of France and Spain, under the orders of Vice Admiral Villeneuve and Admiral Gravina, began leaving the bay of Cadiz on the nineteenth of October in the morning. A sudden calm kept 25-30 ships at anchor. The 12 or 15 ships able to set sail took advantage of a small breeze to tack about at the entrance to the bay during the night.

On the morning of the twentieth, the wind became favourable. The rest of the squadron came out with a following wind, and we saw the fleet soon disappear.

The fleet was composed of:
18 French ships
15 Spanish ships
5 French frigates
2 Brigs
Total 40 vessels sailing in a line

At midday the fleet was out of sight. The weather began to cloud over. The British came in sight in the morning with 9 ships. A frigate and other vessels fired several cannon blasts and sent some signals. In the night, Rear Admiral Magon (de Medina) caught sight of the British. On the Monday morning, the twenty-first, the combined fleet stood within sight of the British – the latter had twenty-seven ships of the line, ten of which were three-deckers, commanded by Admiral Nelson, with Admirals Collingwood and Calder under him.

The British fleet advanced in a single line towards the head of the combined fleet. Then, the fleet advanced in the same direction but in two lines, at the level of our centre. The fleet then turned as if to attack, threatening both wings. When it was at about the range of several cannon shots, the fleet then changed the manoeuvre and headed full-sail for the centre of the combined fleet, broke the line with her two columns, one of which had at the head four three-deckers with several other very strong vessels, and the other had three three-deckers similarly closely supported.

The first strike was directed principally at General Villeneuve and he was attacked by four ships. The fight began at Midday and lasted until five o’clock with the most lively and sustained action on both sides. At half past three, Bucentaure, led by General Villeneueve, was completely dismasted and obliged to surrender. The other ships near her, both French and Spanish, were attacked with the same violence, and almost all the ships in the centre were entirely crippled, filled with holes and forced to surrender. Admiral Dumanoir, commanding the van, taking advantage of a little wind, came down the other side of the enemy, attacked with strength and fought a fierce combat. Admiral Gravina had a less favourable wind and had less chance to come to the centre, but he too with his division fought a similarly hard fight and his ships were less damaged.

There you have roughly speaking the whole of this very hard-fought fight, terrible during the action, and appalling afterwards. Admiral Villeneuve was brought alone with an adjutant general to a British ship. Eighty men were quickly sent to take his ship. It contained 400 wounded or dead. The ships Achille caught fire and exploded an hour after the battle. Algésiras was taken, Admiral Magon was killed and his captain wounded; the ship was razed like a hulk. Intrépid was sunk.

It is said that one hour after the battle General Dumanoir headed for the South West with four ships. We have not heard from him since. We hope that was able to get through the straits.(Of Gibraltar.)

The night following the battle was terrible. The south wind rose with the greatest force. On the following day we saw the admiral Gravina with 5 French ships, 6 Spanish ships and 4 frigates anchor in the entrance to the bay.

If the weather had been better, these might perhaps have been the only remains we would have seen at Cadiz. But the sea became terrible. The British could no longer hold their prizes nor even keep watch over them. The crews of these captured ships rose up and brought back to Cadiz Bucentaure (where she sank in the entrance to the bay), Algésiras (entirely dismasted), and Neptune and Santa-Anna, (also dismasted).

The disaster during the night was even more terrible than that of the previous day. On the coast we continuously heard the alarm and distress cannon. Aigle was dismasted, seriously threatened by a dangerous coastline and continuously threatened ruin, but we have luckily just managed to save her.

Fougueux was thrown onto the coast in a very bad state and was completely lost.

We have the greatest concern regarding Mont-Blanc, Berwick, Swiftsure and Scipion.

In fine, there were only 8 French ships in the bay, one of which sank(I.e., Bucentaure, mentioned above.), two of which were dismasted.(I.e., Algésiras and Neptune, mentioned above. Also in the port were Pluton, Héros, Indomptable, and Argonaute. This however only makes 7 ships. Perhaps the viewer is thinking of Aigle which ran aground in Cadiz bay.) One blew up,(I.e., Achille.) another sank at sea,(I.e., Intrépide.) one was completely lost.(I.e., Fougueux, mentioned above.) The result is that we do not know what has happened to 7 ships.(Presumably Redoutable (sunk), Mont-Blanc, Berwick, Swiftsure, Scipion, Duguay-Trouin, and Formidable.)

The Spanish had 7 ships in the bay, three of which were dismasted. They have the same concern for the 8 still missing.

The dreadful storm, which has been raging for the last four days, has not however permitted the British to carry any ships out of the gulf. They too are closed in and tack as much as possible. Sometimes we can see 15 ships, sometimes 20. Sometimes they are towing the 7 or 8 completely dismasted ships, sometimes they let them go. This evening they set fire to a Spanish ship. It would appear certain that they possess 7 completely dismasted three-deckers.

General Nelson was wounded in the rest of his damaged arm: it would appear that he is dead. General Gravina had been very seriously wounded in the arm. His squadron leader is seriously wounded. General Alava is very seriously wounded. 4 or 5 French captains have been killed, 7 Spanish captains have been killed.

The helmsman’s log for the French ship, Mont-Blanc, in Dumanoir’s division (National Archives, London, UK, HCA/32/1096.)

The entry for 28-29 Vendémiaire, An XIV (20-21 October, 1805)

From 4 o’clock to 8 o’clock in the morning

The rest of the night little wind. Without the hunier mast and perroquet mast.

The enemy is still sending some signals.

At 6-30 took a reading of the land supposed to be Cadiz […]

At sunrise we saw 31 ships, both large and small. At 7 o’clock the general gave a signal to form a natural battle line. The enemy was heading for us in loose order,(The French word is “indépendant”.) the west wind weak, we could hardly manoeuvre.

From 8 o’clock to Midday

At 9 o’clock the order was given to the army (sic) to ‘virer de bord lof per lof’ all together,(Basically a u-turn.) we could hardly manoeuvre. The enemy was still heading for us, wind to the rear, but in disorder because of the calm. But they nevertheless kept on coming towards us. The enemy divided into two columns, one heading for the tail of our army and the other aiming for the van. Wind still small; unable to get ourselves in order.

From Midday to 6 o’clock.

At 1 o’clock, the centre of the army(I.e., of Dumanoir's squadron.) began firing. The weather overcast all along the horizon. Wind still by degrees to port, even under the hunier mast. At quarter-past one the van began firing, but we were too far off. At 1-30 the whole army fired. At the same time, we began firing. Saw a three-decker, the hune mast, the perroquet de fougue mast blown down.(I.e., Victory. According to Dr Beatty on Victory (quoted in Geoffrey Bennett, The Battle of Trafalgar, B.Y. Batsford, 1977, p. 192), in this period in which Nelson's flagship was exposed to the fire of the enemy van, Victory lost her mizzen topmast, all her studding sails and their booms on both sides. Casualties numbered 20 killed and 30 wounded.) At the same time, saw a three-decker ship completely dismasted. Bucentaur lost her main mast and her perroquet de fougue mast. At half-past two General Dumanoir gave a signal to the ships in the van to come about. The whole of the British army combines and attacks the centre. There was so little wind that on coming about we hit Intrépide, but the only damage we suffered was the end of the foremast. At three o’clock, the …(Illegible. Presumably an abbreviation of a ship's name.) had lost all its masts. The Bucentaur suffered the same fate. At 3-30, our perroquet mast went ahead of Scipion. At 4 o’clock we began firing again. At 4-30 a ship caught fire; don’t know from which nation. We thought it was British. Two British ships were boarded at the same time. We were fighting in disorder. The two vessels boarded were dismasted at the moment they were boarded. We saw fifteen ships dismasted, one of which burnt.

At 5 o’clock the battle was over. At 5-30 the sun set. We took a reading of Cape Trafalgar at 5° degrees east, 6 or 7 leagues off. At 6 o’clock in the evening, the ship Achille came to an end in an explosion. General Dumanoir gave us the signal to follow his manoeuvre ‘tribord amure sous la voile with des hune sails, the basse voiles and the grand perroquet’. Weather very covered, wind to the west.

[Translation of the notes on the drawing]

1. Observation squadron commanded by Admiral Gravina and rear-admiral Magon.

2. Centre squadron commanded by admiral Villeneuve.

3. Leading squadron commanded by generals Alava and Dumanoir.

4. The British fleet in a single line aiming for the head of the combined fleet.

5. The British fleet divides and continues in two columns up to the level of our centre.

6. It continues along those two lines.

7. The fleet turns to the left and to the right, as if to attack our two extremities, and changes direction at a distance of three cannon shots.

8. The fleet turns towards our centre and breaks the line at the very centre, coming up on the rear of admiral Villeneuve, and begins an attack directed solely on the whole of the central squadron.

Plan of the Battle of Trafalgar resembling the famous Magendi version, printed in Tuscany in December 1805. Courtesy Private Collection.

‘A Harsh, But Necessary, Apprenticeship’: New French Accounts and a Previously Unknown Sketch of the Battle of Trafalgar

Notes