Book review: The Art of War

Baron Antoine Henri De Jomini's classic The Art of War was translated into English twice at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y.. The best-known translation, by Captain G. H. Mendell and Lieutenant W. P. Graihill in 1862, was edited by J. B Lippincot and Company in Philadelphia, but the most complete edition was that of 1854, by Major O.F. Winship and Lieutenant E. E. McLean. Legacy Books has brought to light the 1854 version, which included the Letter to the Emperor of Russia, the advertisement and the notice of the Present Theory of War and of its Utility. 

Few writers influenced military operations up to 1870 as much as Jomini. Since Napoleon did not write a book regarding the nature of war and a method for military operations, we can say that task passed to Jomini. Swiss by birth, a Général de Brigade in the Napoleonic army, aide-de-camp of Marshal Michel Ney, enemy of Marshal Alexandre Berthier, military adviser to Tsar Alexander I, tutor of future tsars Nicolas I and Alexander II, and military advisor to Napoleon III for the Franco-Austrian war of 1859,  Jomini was himself influenced, perhaps too much, by operations of the Seven Years War, by the personality of Frederick the Great, and the by the wars of the French Revolution (one of his books was the impressive History of the Campaigns of the Revolution). The summarized version of The Art of War was first published in 1830, and an updated edition in 1838, not long after Marie von Clausewitz published the tenth and last volume of her husband's writing. Thus, we can see The Art of War as a rival of Clausewitz's On War. 

While Jomini declared that war is as an art and not a science, Clausewitz regards it as “something between art and science… something like politics.” Clausewitz additionally saw it as a kind of game, because of its inherent accidental factor.  Clausewitz, however, completely ignored the sea factor. 

Jomini's book analyzes step by step the methods and the ways of war. Many of his statements are still correct; for example, that the French army's use of large offensive infantry columns during the Waterloo battle cost to it the victory, or that there must be a supreme commander of all the artillery coordinating all the units and subunits of an army in order to concentrate fire more effectively. 

Other statements of his proved to be wrong.  For example, the Napoleonic system that depended primarily on the soldiers' legs was impracticable in vast countries like Russia, where logistics were lacking. In World War II, the German army subsisted on the fertile lands of Russia and Ukraine for three years. Jomini, while agreeing with Clausewitz that during the campaign in Russia Napoleon did everything he could to protect his rear and his flanks, disagrees with Clausewitz's conclusion that Russia was an impossible country for an army to conquer, attributing the campaign's failure simply to the magnitude of wartime preparation. Jomini also contradicts Clausewitz's opinion that in a war on mountainous terrain the defensive army should avoid movement because it will loose the advantages of the local defenses, using as an example General André Masséna's campaign in Switzerland, with the French army's continuous and persistent attacks. 

Jomini's book had an arguably excessive influence on the U.S. Army, especially during the Civil War, when American generals put its theories into practice. Major General Henry W. Halleck first earned his reputation translating Jomini's Vie politique et militaire de Napoleon, then as a military strategist and finally as chief of staff of the Union Army. 

John-Allen Price, who wrote the introduction of the restored edition, believes that Jomini is forgotten today as military writer and Clausewitz has held the greater influence over modern armies since 1870. Somehow, though, I believe that Jomini's statements on the morale of an army as a key factor for victory is still extremely relevant. All those who love history will still find The Art of War fascinating.