In his important article published in 1926 in the Revue des Deux Mondes (XXIV 824), Gabriel Hanotaux opens with the words: “The year of 1807 is the year of fate in the reign of Napoleon”. (Quoted in Peter Geyl, Napoleon for and against, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, p. 417.) This essay is a consideration of the international politics in the run up to that year and the Battle of Eylau. Counter to expectations, the brilliant victory of Jena/Auerstedt did not bring an end to the war. Napoleon’s army was a long way from France. Russian troops were massing on the borders of Prussia (despite not having arrived in time to save Prussia, they were happy to provide a safe haven for Frederick William, since he was the Russian emperor’s personal friend). And in the background stood the eternal enemy, Britain. Napoleon’s double strategy was to strike at Britain through her commerce in a sort of cold war (the Berlin Decree) and to face up to the immediate Russian threat through military means, in what has been called the Polish campaign. But these were by no means obligatory measures. After Jena, Napoleon was complete master of Western Europe. How are we to understand his actions?
Franco-Prussian relations and the continental blockade
Some accounts of Napoleon place the blame for the hostilities continuing after the battle of Jena on what is called a ‘Fourth Coalition’. According to this account, Prussia and Russia, bankrolled by Britain, are the aggressors and Napoleon merely retaliates, against his will. Recent historians have given a more nuanced view of this key moment in the history of the Empire. It has been shown that whilst Prussia to large extent brought war down upon her own head, she faced the might of France alone, without coalition partners;(See the article on the Battle of Jena here on the site.) in the September of 1806 Britain stalled Prussian diplomats’ attempts to enlist British financial assistance and Russia did not act decisively to come her ally’s aid. And so, the day after the double battle (and double defeat), Frederick William wrote to Napoleon asking for an armistice. Napoleon refused fearing that the Russians might arrive. On 22 October, with his position stabilised, Napoleon finally offered terms to Frederick-William’s envoy Lucchesini. When these terms were not accepted, the French army completed the occupation of Prussia and its fortresses, thus forcing Frederick William to the negotiating table. The terms now offered however were even harsher than before. This truce of Charlottenburg, dated 16 November, was finally signed by Prussian plenipotentiaries, but it was not to be ratified by Frederick William. The latter’s advisers had warned him that the signing of such a treaty would put him at war with Russia, and that if Russian troops were expelled from East Prussia there would be revolt in Prussia’s Polish lands. Frederick William (it must be said) was also at this point backed up by his Russian ally’s army. In parallel with the continued conflict with the allied Prussia and Russia, Napoleon began a cold war with Britain (whom he believed to be the financier and instigator of the Prussian and Russian opposition). He called it his ‘continental system’, and it was ‘continental’, in that it was an attempt ‘to conquer the sea (that is Britain) by the might of the land (the European continent)’. In this war to the death with the island nation, the continent was to be hermetically sealed against British trade. For the continental system to work, it had to cover the whole of Europe. By beating Prussia at Jena and occupying the country Napoleon had brought that country forcibly into his ‘system’. He now turned his attention to Russia.
Franco-Russian-Prussian relations
As we saw in the article on the Battle of Jena, peace negotiations with Russia had come to nothing. Indeed, even a brief glance at the two years preceding November 1806 shows that this period had been a poor one for Franco-Russian relations. In St Petersburg there had been disgust by the Duc d’Enghien affair (summer 1804), offence at the French imperial coronation in Paris (winter 1804-05), scandal at the French annexation of Liguria and the creation of the kingdom of Italy (summer 1805), and horror and desire for revenge when faced with crushing defeat at Austerlitz (winter 1805-06). One could be forgiven doubt as to the sincerity of Alexander’s peace negotiations (in tandem with Britain) in the summer of 1806. But when (not surprisingly) these peace talks failed, Alexander fell back on his personal friendship with the Prussian king, Frederick William, and became an ally of Prussia when Prussia finally decided to adopt open opposition to Napoleon.(For Alexander and William Frederick's friendship, see Paul Bailleu (ed.), Briefwechsel König Frierich Wilhelm’s III und der Königin Luise mit Kaiser Alexander I, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1900, and especially the letters dated 28 and 30 November, 1806 (the Tsar assuring the king that every means possible would be used to maintain the good cause) and the letter of 23 November, 1806 (the Prussian king’s decision to fight to death with the 140,000 Russian soldiers who had come to his aid).)
Since for the ‘system’ to work it had to mobilise the whole of continental Europe, Napoleon had to bring Russia over to his side.(The 24th Bulletin de la Grande Armée reveals a little of the results of Napoleon’s planned ‘system’: “The British did not want to make peace. They will do so, but France will have more states and coastline in her federative system”. 31 October, 1806, Correspondance, 11135.) In order to do that, he had to separate Russia from Britain, still defensively allied since the fallout after Austerlitz. Napoleon knew that Britain and Russia’s alliance was one of ‘inconvenience’, that they were difficult partners, superficially friendly but resolutely pursuing their own agendas, and that their strategic aims rarely coincided (indeed they more often clashed). Napoleon also knew that Alexander had no love for the British. The Russian emperor (along with most of the rest of Europe) was particularly frustrated with British arrogant behaviour on the seas which involved seizing cargoes and searching ships, in short acting as though sea belonged to them.
And so with the aim of forcing Russia into an alliance in order to seal off the continent and to deprive Britain of her last major continental ally, the emperor decided to take war to the Russian troops stationed in Poland aiming to take advantage of Polish support and resources and in order to discourage Austria from intervening in the conflict. (In his letter to Sultan Selim (dated 11 November, 1806, Correspondance, 11232) he remarks “I am looking for the Russians and am taking the fight to them” (“Je les cherche et vais au-devant d’eux”).) As for Austria, though she was neutral and unarmed, Napoleon nevertheless wrote to Eugène asking him to set troops on the Austrian border to discourage any rash Austrian behaviour. (Correspondance, 4 November, 1806, N°. 11172.) However, despite the long-term strategic goals of the Napoleonic ‘system’ (which, it must be said, remained hidden to everyone apart from the emperor himself), on the local level in that November of 1806, the Russian troops positioned on the leaky Poland/Prussia frontier were a threat to the French spread out through Prussia. In tactical terms, if Napoleon had let Bennigsen take the initiative he would have been poorly placed.
In addition to taking the Russians on in Poland, Napoleon also contacted the Sublime Porte in an attempt to agree a treaty; the aim was to employ diversionary tactics, threatening Russia’s southern borders. At this time Alexander was in fact heading for war with the Ottoman empire. Russia and the Porte had a treaty whereby the replacement of the hospodars (vizirs) of Moldavia and Wallachia had to have both party’s consent. The Sultan had however replaced the hospodars with own candidates. Russia used this technical issue as pretext for confrontation, although its real fears were that a Franco-Ottoman alliance would close the straits to Russian shipping. Since the Porte was not prepared for war, it backed down. But the Tsar insisted on more concessions and carried out the planned Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia in November – Alexander and foreign minister Budberg thought that the occupation was necessary in order to preserve Russian influence at Constantinople, to bring the Sultan to heel and finally to attempt to bring Balkan Christians (including Serbs) over to the Russian side. The Sultan replied by declaring war on Russia on 22 December. This declaration of war was certainly emboldened by letters from Napoleon. In a letters dated 9 and 11 November 1806, (Correspondance, N°s. 11216 and 11232.) one to Cambacérès and the other to the Sultan Selim, Napoleon notes that with all the Russian troops in Poland, this would be the best time for the Turks to send troops to Choczim and to the frontiers of the Dniester so as to repossess Moldavia and Wallachia. The clear general aim was to try to split the Russian army in two, and to establish good relations with Turkey with the aim of threatening British interests in the Middle and Far East.
The Polish question
As Andrzej Nieuwazny has recently pointed out, in the decade before Austerlitz Napoleon had no Polish policy whatsoever.(Thierry Lentz, (ed.) Napoléon et l’Europe, Fayard, 2005, p. 84-102.) That country did not serve his diplomacy and was counter to France’s strategic interests. However, after that key battle, observers such as the Russian envoy Pierre Dolgorouki began to suspect that Napoleon was contemplating causing an insurrection in Poland and putting Murat on the Polish throne.(Correspondance cited in Lentz, op. cit., Grand-duc Nicolas Mikhaïlowitch, Kniazja Dolgorukie, St Petersburg, 1901, p. 94-95.) However, when Frederick-William did not do what Francis had done after Austerlitz but rather opted to continue the struggle, dragging the conflict into Polish territory, Poland became important almost by accident. From thereon Napoleon’s raising of the Polish question was intended as a weapon against both Prussia and Russia. Many Poles rallied to his side, as he posed as the protector of those indignant at the unjust partition of Polish territory, the most recent being in 1795, although there were some notable exceptions, such as Tadeusz Kosciuszko (the leader of the uprising of 1794), who distrusted Napoleon.
The emperor, however, refused to endorse the re-creation of Poland.(On 11 December, in Posnan, when the future Justice Minister for the Duchy of Warsaw, said to Napoleon “We are Poles who have come to bring you homage”, Napoleon replied emphatically, three times, “Yes, yes, you are Warsavians”, quoted in Lentz, op. cit., p. 88-89.) Indeed he had two main reasons for preferring to keep his options open: first, vis-à-vis his enemies in the current war– any unequivocal support for the Polish cause would have served simply to cement the shaky coalition facing the emperor; and second, vis-à-vis the coming peace – if he had opened the Pandora’s box of a re-united Poland, a lasting peace would have been compromised. And so during the seven months leading up to the treaty of Tilsit, the country was organised under the protection of the Grande Armée and called initially Prussian Poland and then later “Poland conquered from the King of Prussia” and governed by an ad-hoc governing commission.
Britain and the ‘Fourth Coalition’
The partners in the “Fourth Coalition” are generally cited as Russia, Prussia, Britain and Sweden. The coalition was not however very successful and did not really get going until the spring of 1807. Up until that time, England for varying reasons played hard to get. To begin with, throughout the period leading up to the Battle of Jena, Britain and Prussia were at war with each other, as a result of the Franco-Prussian Treaty of Paris in February 1806. As Prussia began to descend into war with France in August-September of 1806, Russia and Britain were conducting secret talks and the Prussian diplomat Baron von Jacobi was having talks with Lord Howick. Frederick William had attempted to build bridges with Britain (following Alexander’s advice) (Letter of 6 September, 1806, Paul Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807. Diplomatische Correspondenzen / herausgegeben von Paul Bailleu, 1880-1887, Leipzig, vol. II, p. 424.) by re-opening the Hanseatic estuaries to British shipping (forcibly closed to Britain via the Franco-Prussian treaty of February 1806), but this had had no immediate effect. As Frederick William noted, in the same letter, any discussion of the details regarding the return of Hanover would have torpedoed the talks straight away. In the talks, British minister Grenville had not been forthcoming and refused initially to endorse Prussia’s idea of a North German Confederation – even though this would have presented a barrier to French interests in the area. As part of the deal, Grenville had wanted Russia to endorse British demands for Hanover in exchange for British support for Prussia. Russia for her part refused to support such demands. On 20 September, 1806, Prussia offered to return Hanover to Britain. But in reality she was in no position to offer this French-occupied territory. Britain reacted cautiously, sending Lord Morpeth as ambassador to Prussia but with no instructions to encourage the Prussians. (C. D. Hall, British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992, p. 135.) Prussian demands for subsidies fell on deaf ears, since, as Grenville put it, the requests were not part of a subsidy treaty with definite advantages for Britain spelt out.(See here the memorandum by Prussian politician, Friedrich Wilhelm von Zastrow, ‘On the situation in which Prussia finds herself today’, written at Memel on 16 January 1807, in Paul Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807. Diplomatische Correspondenzen / herausgegeben von Paul Bailleu, 1880-1887, Leipzig, vol. II, pp. 584-86: “As to Britain, she has shown herself not only disposed to a re-accommodation with Prussia but also to provide her with pecuniary means with which to continue the war, as soon as she can hope for real benefits. However, since the state of weakness to which that monarchy has been reduced, the conduct of the British cabinet has changed radically. Mylord Hutchinson, who left London on 21 November, gave to H.M. the king a letter from his sovereign dated 14 October, composed entirely only of bland terms and without giving any details regarding the subject of subsidies which had already been discussed between Lord Howick and Baron de Jacobi before his departure. He did not even reply to the project for a treaty which had been given to him on 28 December. What hope can we get from such a procedure, and is it not sufficient proof that since we no longer have the means to pursue the war with vigour, this plenipotentiary is now trying to decline the article related to subsidies, and it is even unclear whether there will be any means of coming to an agreement with him on the subject of a loan. After all these considerations, it is clear that the most advantageous occasions which could result from the continuation of the war, at least provided that other powers and especially Austria do not enter it, would not produce for Prussia anything other than the conditions already mentioned by Napoleon.”) Britain did send note to Prussia on 20th October (six days after Jena) promising the assembly of forces on the coast for diversionary purposes, but it was also noted that with winter coming on and the Hanover issue still unsettled, large-scale support was unlikely. Britain also offered Prussia the possibility of raising a loan of £500,000 but which would be part of a future treaty. Indeed, British politicians thought that the Prussian treasury had not been taken by the French but still contained £2 million – British envoy Hutchinson was asked in November to ascertain the truth of this and empowered to offer treasury bills of £200,000, but only if Prussia were in dire need.(Hall, op. cit., p. 136.) This unhelpful attitude was motivated not only perhaps by Schadenfreude at the fate of the thief of Hanover but also fears of financial overstretching.(For Frederick William’s ‘utilitarian’ attitude to Britain see Frederick William’s letters to Alexander dated 23 June and 6 September here. In his letter to Alexander of 23 June, 1806 (Paul Bailleu, Preussen und Frankreich von 1795 bis 1807. Diplomatische Correspondenzen / herausgegeben von Paul Bailleu, 1880-1887, Leipzig,, vol. II, p. 474-75), Frederick William noted: “I beg you by all that is sacred, Sire, to use every means at your disposal to force the king of Sweden to remain calm. You would not believe how much this state of affairs is harmful and prejudicial to the good cause. N-p-n (sic) desires nothing more than to see me join this prince, he is awaiting this moment impatiently, so as to be able to give immediate action to his ulterior projects for the North of Europe, which I will not be able to suppress or defeat if this odious and unreasonable affair does not end as soon as possible. Not only does this state of affairs harm all the measures and arrangements established a long time ago for the consolidation of my financial and military strength, so as to be able to present a sufficient barrier to the ambitious and boundless aims of our new allies. […] To put it bluntly, I shall tell you, Sire, that it is Britain which is whipping up more and more the vertiginous spirit of that extreme and fanatical mind, simply with the aim of getting us all one against the other and so bringing the attention of the French to continental matters, so as to be able to act even more arbitrarily on the seas and in other parts of the world. It is only in the interests of this system that continental affairs interest Britain …”. This attitude had changed two months later, but only because money was in the offing. In his letter to Alexander dated 6 September, 1806 (printed in Bailleu, op. cit., vol. II, p. 553) he noted: ‘I must act, and in order for me to act with vigour, Britain must offer me sufficient means immediately, even if it means discussing the numbers more rigorously when successes will have allowed us the time.” It revolts him but he has to seek money from Britain.) Windham had observed at the end of September that what little aid they could send would do little good. Indeed Windham was so against aiding Prussia that when discussions took place regarding a potential continental expedition he deliberately over-inflated the cost of hire of transports in an attempt to nip in the bud any attempts that Prime Minister Grenville might have made to be generous towards Prussia. Britain still had not sent any aid in December, for in that month the Tsar wrote a letter pleading for a “diversion on the enemy, in the north of Europe, by a powerful expedition to the coast of France or Holland’, and there were complaints of British inactivity in January.(Quoted in Hall, op. cit., p. 137.) It is quite clear that Britain had not yet taken an active part with Russia and Prussia against France.(In his project for the treaty of Charlottenburg, of 16 November, Frederick William, (Bailleu, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 578) in article 10, offers to renounce any offensive treaty which he may have made with enemies of France, and “any future treaty which might have been made with Britain” (my italics).)
Conclusion
As with the Battle of Jena, the Polish campaign took place in the absence of any effective British participation. Napoleon took pains to raise the Polish problem but without proclaiming the return of the kingdom of Poland. He also managed to set Turkey against Russia in his attempt to drive the latter into the continental system. Prussia and Russia continued the armed struggle hoping to avenge both Austerlitz and Jena. But all parties were hampered by the winter weather. Clearly campaigning at that time of year in those parts was an exceedingly risky business. As Napoleon himself noted on 8 November, regarding the commandeering of all the spirits, liqueur, and rum in Stettin, “It is going to be very cold, and strong alcohol could save my army”.(Correpondance, 11213.) The going underfoot was very slow and going to get worse and startling, quick manoeuvres were unlikely to be possible. It was never going to be an easy campaign, and it led not surprisingly to bloodbath at Eylau, an appalling precursor of 1812. As Daru put it in his memoirs, “It was on leaving Berlin that Napoleon took the wrong road”.(Quoted in Tranié, Jean, and J.C. Carmigniani, Napoléon et la Russie: les années victorieuses, 1805-1807, [Paris]: Copernic, 1980, p. 151.)